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R. v. Bryan:  
The Supreme Court and the 
Electoral Process 
Christopher D. Bredt and Margot Finley 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the commitment to freedom of expression guaranteed 
by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 lies 
the belief that this liberty is “the matrix, the indispensable condition of 
nearly every other form of freedom”.2 As Nicholas E. Devlin has noted, 
“the intimate connection between freedom of expression and the 
institutions of democracy has secured a place of privileged protection for 
political speech in Canadian rights jurisprudence.”3 
Political expression has been held to be “the single most important 
and protected type of expression. It lies at the core of the guarantee of 
free expression”.4 Political expression embraces the right of the speaker 
to communicate with fellow citizens as well as the right of voters to 
listen and have access to the commentary, perspective and opinions of 
other Canadians on the electoral process. Political speech is regarded as 
“high value” speech because it is said to further the “core values” of 
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1
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.), citing Cardozo J. in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, at 327 (1937).  
3
  Nicholas E. Devlin, “Opinion Polls and the Protection of Political Speech — A 
Comment on Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)” (1996-1997) 28 Ottawa L. 
Rev. 411, at para. 15. 
4
  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 at para. 
11 (S.C.C.), per the Chief Justice and Major J. (dissenting in part)  [hereinafter “Harper”]. 
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individual autonomy and self-development, the search for truth and the 
promotion of public participation in the democratic process.5 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with a constitutional 
challenge under section 2(b) to section 329 of the Canada Elections Act,6 
which prohibits the transmission of election results in one electoral 
district to another electoral district before the close of all polling stations 
in that other district. In R. v. Bryan,7 a majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the Attorney General was justified in limiting political 
expression. The objective that outweighed that most important right was 
“informational equality”.8 The majority accepted the Attorney General’s 
argument that “democracy requires that no individual should have a 
general access to information, unavailable to others, that can play a role 
in the exercise of his own right to vote.”9 The majority found that the 
government might reasonably adopt measures to deal with the perception 
of unfairness created when some voters have general access to 
information that is denied to others, and the further possibility that 
access to that information will affect voter participation or choices.10 
Further, the majority of the Court adopted a relatively low standard for 
the measurement of harm, a highly deferential approach to Parliament in 
the electoral process, and little acknowledgement of arguably our most 
important Charter right. In contrast, the dissent held that a limitation on 
the core Charter guarantee of political expression must be justified by 
convincing evidence, which was not present in this case.  
In this paper, we first provide an overview of recent Supreme Court 
of Canada jurisprudence in the area of freedom of expression in the 
political context, focusing on Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada 
(Attorney General),11 Harper12 and Bryan.13 The paper then critiques the 
elevation of “informational equality” to a democratic imperative. We 
then discuss how the Court has extended the “reasoned apprehension of 
harm” test from its origins in speech at the fringes to political expression 
                                                                                                             
5
  RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 
S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”]. 
6
  S.C. 2000, c. 9. 
7
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bryan”]. 
8
  Id., at paras. 32-53. 
9
  Id., at para. 22. 
10
  Justice Fish wrote concurring reasons, which will not be addressed in this paper.  
11
  [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson”]. 
12
  Supra, note 4. 
13
  Supra, note 7. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 65 
at the core of the section 2(b) guarantee. Finally, the paper considers the 
majority’s unquestioning deference to government in the electoral process. 
Our conclusion is that the Supreme Court of Canada is not providing 
core political expression with the protections that are demanded. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND POLITICAL EXPRESSION: 
FROM THOMSON NEWSPAPERS TO BRYAN 
Prior to Bryan,14 the Court had considered the issue of freedom of 
expression in the electoral context in Thomson15 in 1998, and in Harper16 
in 2000. We will briefly address these cases and draw attention to some 
of the themes that run throughout the Court’s jurisprudence in the area of 
political expression. 
1.  Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) 
Thomson was a challenge to section 322.1 of the Canada Elections 
Act. The impugned provision prohibited the dissemination of opinion 
survey results about voting intentions within a three-day period prior to 
the day of the election. The appellants claimed that this was contrary to 
section 2(b) of the Charter.17 
Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, concluded that section 
322.1 infringed section 2(b) and was not justified by section 1. The 
judgment began by calling for “close attention to context”.18 This would 
facilitate determining the intention of the legislation, performing the 
proportionality analysis and deciding what kind of proof would be required 
from the legislator for the section 1 test. Contextual considerations, 
Bastarache J. wrote, include: (1) whether the government is balancing 
interests; (2) the vulnerability of the group protected by the provision; 
and (3) whether or not the harm in question is capable of scientific 
                                                                                                             
14
  Supra, note 7. 
15
  Supra, note 11. 
16
  Supra, note 4. 
17
  The appellants also claimed that the s. 3 right to vote had also been unjustifiably 
restricted. However, neither judgment hinged on the right to vote analysis, although the majority and 
the minority both concluded in obiter that “to constitute an infringement of the right to vote, a 
restriction on information would have to undermine the guarantee of effective representation.”
 
See 
Thomson, supra, note 11, at paras. 19, 82. 
18
  Id., at para. 87. 
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measurement.19 Justice Bastarache emphasized that the presence of these 
factors does not change the standard of proof in the Charter context from 
the civil, balance of probabilities standard. However, they do “bear on 
the degree of deference which a court should accord to the particular 
means chosen to implement a legislative purpose”.20 
The judgment observed that opinion polls are political information, 
and therefore at the core of the sphere protected by section 2(b).21 The 
group protected by the legislation included both “those who incorrectly 
assume that polls are a perfect measure of voting results on election day, 
and rely on them to an excessive degree in consequence”22 and those 
“who are perfectly aware of the general shortcomings of polls as 
predictions of the result on election day, but who are misled by the 
publication of an inaccurate poll result.”23 
Justice Bastarache identified the objective of allowing time for 
scrutiny and analysis of inaccurate polls before the vote as a pressing and 
substantial (if perhaps overstated in some of the evidence) objective.24  
Justice Bastarache was skeptical about whether the “rational 
connection” required by the Oakes25 test was present. He observed that 
pollsters were not required to publish methodology and other 
background information along with their polls. It was not therefore clear 
to him that scrutiny and analysis of the results would be possible, with or 
without section 322.1’s three-day blackout. 
However, the decision really hinged on the “minimal impairment” 
branch of the Oakes test. Justice Bastarache found that none of the 
appropriate contextual factors that might have suggested deference to the 
government were present. First, there was no vulnerable group being 
protected. The evidence did not establish that Canadian voters are a 
vulnerable group relative to pollsters and the media who publish polls. 
The presumption should be that the Canadian voter is a rational actor 
who can learn from experience and make independent judgments about 
the value of particular sources of electoral information. 
                                                                                                             
19
  Id., at paras. 87-90. 
20
  Id., at para. 111. 
21
  Id., at para. 92. 
22
  Id.  
23
  Id. 
24
  The objective of creating a “rest period” before the vote, during which the onslaught of 
polling data would be subdued, encouraging voters to focus on the issues, was not found to be 
sufficiently pressing and substantial.  
25
  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
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Second, while a “reasoned apprehension of harm” might in some 
cases constitute sufficient evidence from the government, “the claims of 
widespread or significant harm based on logical inferences derived from 
surrounding factors are not compelling in the context of factors which 
refute such logical inferences.”26 Justice Bastarache explained that the 
reasoned apprehension of harm test had been applied in earlier cases 
where it had been suggested, but not proven, that the nature of 
expression at issue undermined the position of groups or individuals as 
equal participants in society, and where it was difficult to establish that 
type of harm scientifically.27  
The majority refused to accept that the harm that some voters might 
be misled by polls warranted a significant level of deference to government 
to fashion means that infringe on freedom of expression.28 Justice 
Bastarache concluded that there was no proportionality between the 
deleterious effects and the benefits of the ban, given the profound impact 
of section 322.1 on the constitutional freedom of expression.29 Such an 
impact could not be tolerated, given the respondent’s failure to show that 
the harm allegedly remedied by the section was a pressing one. 
Justice Gonthier wrote in dissent, supported by Lamer C.J.C. and 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. While concurring with the majority’s conclusions 
about the constitutional right to vote and the finding of an infringement 
of section 2(b), Gonthier J. argued that the infringement was saved by 
section 1.  
Justice Gonthier observed that freedom of expression is not an end 
in of itself, but rather a means to three broader ends — “promoting truth, 
political or social participation, and self-fulfillment.”30 The impugned 
provision, he found, was designed to bring about informed votes rather 
than misinformed votes, and therefore actually contributed to these three 
goals. 
The dissent accepted the general principle that misleading political 
speech will be corrected by other voices in an atmosphere of free 
expression, and need not therefore be constrained by the state. However, 
he argued, the final three days of an electoral campaign (the period 
affected by the impugned provision) constitute an exception to this rule. 
                                                                                                             
26
  Thomson, supra, note 11, at para. 113. 
27
  Id., at para. 115. 
28
  Id., at para. 117. 
29
  Id., at para. 127. At paras. 123-26, Bastarache J. explained how this branch of the Oakes 
test was distinguished from other parts of it. 
30
  Id., at para. 25. 
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The election ends the debate. Therefore, although “errors and 
misinformation may be corrected after the election … the value of the 
correction is lost.”31 This exceptional circumstance suggested that the 
exceptional remedy of section 322.1 might be appropriate. 
Justice Gonthier defined the purpose of section 322.1 as “improving 
the search for truth, by providing for the timeliness of the publication of 
poll results, so as to allow discussion”.32 Under the proportionality test, 
Gonthier J. found the rational connection between the law’s ends and 
means to be self-evident.33 He adopted a highly deferential threshold for 
the “minimal impairment” analysis: 
… this Court should not second-guess the wisdom of Parliament in its 
endeavour to draw the line between competing credible evidence, once 
it has been established, on the civil standard of proof, that Parliament’s 
objective was pressing and substantial …34 
The dissent was willing to allow Parliament discretion, so long as it had 
a “reasonable basis” for concluding the measure was minimally 
impairing and that 72 hours was the minimum necessary period for the 
blackout.35 Justice Gonthier concluded that the measure fostered the 
decision-making process for voters and therefore had “a positive impact 
on freedom of expression”36 at the small price of a short-term publication 
blackout. 
The majority’s approach in Thomson affirmed section 2(b)’s 
underlying values, regardless of context, and ensured that any limits on 
expressive activity are conditional on the evidentiary requirements of 
section 1.37 Unfortunately, during the Court’s next foray into political 
expression, a majority of the Court did not demand strict adherence to 
these important principles.  
                                                                                                             
31
  Id., at para. 28. 
32
  Id., at para. 29. 
33
  Id., at para. 40. 
34
  Id., at para. 42. 
35
  Id., at paras. 43, 51. 
36
  Id., at para. 61. 
37
  See Jamie Cameron, “Governance and Anarchy in the s. 2(b) Jurisprudence: A Comment 
on Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 71, at 102. 
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2.  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) 
Harper38 was a challenge to the third-party spending limitations in 
the Canada Elections Act. Among other things, the impugned sections of 
the Act restricted election spending by persons other than candidates or 
political parties to $3,000 per riding and $150,000 nationally per 
election, forbade third party advertising on election day, and required 
third party advertisers to register with and report to the Chief Electoral 
Officer.39 Justice Bastarache once again wrote the majority judgment, but 
this time upheld these restrictions on freedom of expression as 
constitutional. 
Both majority and dissent found that the impugned sections violated 
section 2(b).40 The two judgments also agreed that the provisions had 
“pressing and substantial” objectives — promoting equality in political 
debate; preventing circumvention of candidate and party spending limits; 
and promoting public faith in the democratic system.41 There was also 
consensus that the provisions were sufficiently rationally connected to 
the objectives, despite the inability of the Attorney General to precisely 
specify the extent of their effect.42  
It was at the final two steps of the Oakes test — whether the law is 
minimally impairing and whether its benefit is proportional to its Charter 
infringement — that the dissent parted company from the majority, 
finding that the spending provisions were neither minimally impairing 
nor proportional. The majority found that the law was sufficiently 
“tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary”43 and that 
its salutary effects outweighed its impact on freedom of expression.44  
The dissent’s Oakes analysis in Harper was consistent with the 
majority’s approach in Thomson,45 wherein the Charter right at issue — 
expressive freedom in the electoral context — was at the heart of the 
analysis. Chief Justice McLachlin, in dissent, Major and Binnie JJ. 
concurring, emphasized that the denial of effective communication to 
                                                                                                             
38
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.). 
39
  Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 323, 350-57, 359-60, 362. 
40
  Harper, supra, note 38, at paras. 9, 66. The s. 2(b) violation was conceded by the 
Attorney General. 
41
  Id., at paras. 22-27, paras. 91-103. 
42
  Id., at paras. 28-31, 104-109. 
43
  Id., at para. 110, quoting the standard set out in RJR-MacDonald, [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, 
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160 (S.C.C.). 
44
  Harper, id., at paras. 119-21. 
45
  Thomson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.). 
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citizens through limiting third-party spending violates free expression 
where it warrants the greatest protection — in the sphere of political 
discourse. Any limits on the core value of political expression must 
clearly and convincingly demonstrate that they serve a valid objective, 
minimally impair the right and enhance the democratic process rather 
than hinder it. In this case, the dissent found that there was no evidence 
to support the connection claimed by the government, and found that the 
limitation on third-party spending resulted in a virtual ban on 
participation in electoral debate except through political parties. The 
concerns of the dissent in Harper would resurface again in the dissenting 
opinion in Bryan,46 with which McLachlin C.J.C. concurred.  
For the majority, Bastarache J. identified “contextual” factors, as he 
did in Thomson,47 before beginning his section 1 analysis. The majority 
relied on two factors in particular to shift the scales in favour of the 
impugned law. The first contextual factor that supported deference to the 
government was that “the nature of the harm and the efficaciousness of 
Parliament’s remedy in this case is difficult, if not impossible, to measure 
scientifically.”48  
The second key contextual factor was the Court’s endorsement of 
the “egalitarian model”49 of elections:  
The state can equalize participation in the electoral process in two 
ways. … First, the State can provide a voice to those who might 
otherwise not be heard. … Second, the State can restrict the voices 
which dominate the political discourse so that others may be heard as 
well.50 
Under the “egalitarian” model of democracy, active management of the 
political process by Parliament is not only tolerated, but encouraged by 
the Court.  
These two factors resulted in a reduced burden on the Attorney 
General of justifying the section 2(b) infringement. Whereas in Thomson 
Bastarache J. found that no particular deference was due,51 in Harper he 
found that “the contextual factors indicate that the Court should afford 
deference to the balance Parliament has struck between political expression 
                                                                                                             
46
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.). 
47
  Supra, note 45, at paras. 87-95. 
48
  Harper, supra, note 38, at para. 79. 
49
  Id., at para. 64. 
50
  Id., at para. 62. 
51
  Thomson, supra, note 45, at para. 95. 
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and meaningful participation in the electoral process.”52 Another key 
distinction between Thomson and Harper was that the dangers posed by 
the restricted expression were taken much more seriously in the latter 
case than in the former. Justice Bastarache wrote in the Thomson 
judgment that “the social science evidence did not establish that the 
Canadian voter is a vulnerable group relative to pollsters and the media 
who publish polls.”53 In Harper, by contrast, his conclusion on this point 
was that “the danger that political advertising may manipulate or oppress 
the voter means that some deference to the means chosen by Parliament 
is warranted.”54 
With its unquestioning acceptance of the egalitarian model, failure to 
acknowledge the significance of the right at issue, and unreflective 
deference, the Harper judgment expanded upon the few troubling 
aspects of the Thomson decision, and signalled the direction of the Court 
when it again addressed justifiable limits on political expression in 
Bryan. 
3.  R. v. Bryan 
During the 2000 federal election, Paul Charles Bryan transmitted the 
election results from 32 ridings in Atlantic Canada while polling stations 
remained open elsewhere in Canada, by posting the information on a 
website. He was charged with contravening section 329 of the Canada 
Elections Act, which prohibits the transmission of election results in one 
electoral district to another electoral district before the close of all 
polling stations in that other district. Bryan’s application for a declaration 
that section 329 was unconstitutional for unjustifiably infringing his 
freedom of expression was dismissed, and Bryan was convicted of the 
offence. The summary conviction appeal judge declared the provision 
unconstitutional on the ground that it infringed section 2(b) and was not 
saved by section 1, and overturned Bryan’s conviction. The Court of 
Appeal held that section 329 was a justified limit on freedom of 
expression and restored the conviction. 
A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal. With its decision again 
written by Bastarache J., the majority concluded that section 329 does 
infringe freedom of expression, but was justified under section 1. The 
                                                                                                             
52
  Harper, supra, note 38, at para. 111. 
53
  Thomson, supra, note 45, at para. 112. 
54
  Harper, supra, note 38, at para. 85. 
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dissenting opinion, written by Abella J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie and 
LeBel JJ. concurring, strongly disagreed, finding that this limitation on 
the core Charter guarantee of political expression was not justified by the 
evidence provided by the Attorney General.  
The majority found that the objective of section 329 is to ensure 
“informational equality” by adopting reasonable measures to deal with 
the perception of unfairness created when some voters have general 
access to information that is denied to others, and the further possibility 
that access to that information will affect voter participation or choices.  
In determining the nature and sufficiency of the evidence required to 
justify an infringement of section 2(b) of the Charter, the majority found 
that section 329 must be viewed in its context. According to the 
majority, the context is best established by reference to the four factors 
which the Court set out in Thomson55 and expanded upon in Harper:56 (1) 
the nature of the harm and the inability to measure it; (2) the vulnerability 
of the group protected; (3) subjective fears and apprehension of harm; 
and (4) the nature of the infringed activity.57 The result of this contextual 
analysis will determine the level of deference to be afforded to the 
government.  
As Bastarache J. explained:  
The contextual factors are essentially directed at determining to what 
extent the case before the court is a case where the evidence will 
rightly consist of “approximations and extrapolations” as opposed to 
more traditional forms of social science proof, and therefore to what 
extent arguments based on logic and reason will be accepted as a 
foundational part of the s. 1 case.58 
Though the majority and dissent agreed that this contextual analysis is 
the appropriate method of determining the level of deference to government, 
and that Parliament is owed a degree of deference in matters such as the 
electoral process, the Court split on what exactly this deference entails.  
The majority concluded that, given that the harm associated with the 
loss of public confidence in the electoral process or with a breach of the 
principle of informational equality is difficult to measure, logic and 
reason assisted by some social science evidence could constitute sufficient 
proof of the harm. The majority’s approach to deference in the electoral 
                                                                                                             
55
  Thomson, supra, note 45, at paras. 90-96. 
56
  Harper, supra, note 38, at paras. 77-88. 
57
  Bryan, supra, note 46, at paras. 16-30. 
58
  Id., at para. 29. 
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process suggests that the government will have a greatly reduced burden 
to demonstrate through evidence of harm that its restriction of a Charter 
right is justified. In contrast, the dissent demanded that the evidence 
must convincingly establish the consequences of imposing or failing to 
impose the limit on expressive freedom to be justified. In the dissenters’ 
view, “while scientific proof may not always be necessary or available, 
and social science evidence supported by reason and logic can be relied 
upon, the evidence must nonetheless establish the consequences of imposing 
or failing to impose the limit.”59 Instead, in the context of staggered 
hours, the government proffered only speculative and unpersuasive 
evidence to support its claim that an information imbalance is of 
sufficient harm to voter behaviour or perceptions of electoral unfairness 
that it outweighs any damage done to a fundamental and constitutionally 
protected right.60  
The Attorney General relied on three sources of evidence to support 
the publication ban of electoral results under section 329: (1) the evidence 
of Dr. Robert MacDermid, a professor of political science at York 
University; (2) the findings of Electoral Democracy;61 and (3) the 
Decima Research/Carleton University Poll, conducted during the period 
November 25 to December 5, 2005. Though the majority and dissent 
cited almost identical principles from these sources, they came to very 
different conclusions about whether the evidence supported the 
government’s position.  
The majority cited Dr. MacDermid’s evidence to support the finding 
that informational imbalance would result in the loss of public confidence 
in the electoral process, and a resultant decline in participation and 
voting rates, which might ultimately affect the outcome of elections.62 It 
was Dr. MacDermid’s evidence that knowing election results from the 
rest of the country — especially when combined with a media prediction 
of the election’s outcome — could have an impact on voter behaviour, 
including lower turnout and strategic voting.63 However, as the dissent 
noted, the professor based his conclusion that informational imbalance 
can affect voter participation and behaviour on the American experience, 
where staggered voting hours are not part of the electoral reality; unlike 
                                                                                                             
59
  Id., Abella J. dissenting, at para. 103. 
60
  Id., Abella J. dissenting, at para. 110. 
61
  (1991) Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing 
[hereinafter “Lortie Report”]. 
62
  Bryan, supra, note 46, at para. 18. 
63
  Id., Abella J. dissenting, at para. 92. 
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western Canadian voters in the context of staggered hours, western 
American voters may know the likely outcome of an election before they 
vote. Dr. MacDermid acknowledged that before there can be any impact 
on voters’ perception and behaviour from an informational imbalance, 
that imbalance must be of such a nature that voters know or can predict 
the outcome of the election.64 In the context of staggered hours, 
Canadians in western Canada would not be able to predict the outcome 
of the election as they would know, at most, 11 per cent of the national 
election results.  
Both the majority and dissent cited the Lortie Report’s conclusion 
that “Canadians feel very strongly about premature release of election 
results”.65 The basic problem, the Lortie Report stated, “is ensuring that 
voters in western Canada do not know who will form the government 
before the polls close there”66 and suggested that Canadians favoured 
changes in voting hours to eliminate the problem. The majority relied on 
this finding to conclude that the Lortie Report supported maintaining 
public confidence in the electoral system by restraining publication of 
election results until most or all Canadians have voted.67 The majority 
concluded that staggered hours alone do not address the impact on the 
confidence of the public regarding informational equality not being 
respected.68 However, the dissent noted that the Lortie Report’s findings 
that Canadians feel strongly about informational imbalances refers to 
Canadians’ attitudes before staggered hours and explains why the 
Commission recommended staggered hours as an alternative to what the 
Commission acknowledged was an ineffectual ban under section 329.69  
Both the majority and dissent also cited the Commission’s 
conclusion that “the release of some election results before polls close in 
the West — specifically, the results from the 32 seats in Atlantic Canada 
— would not constitute a major problem so long as other results from 
eastern Canada were not available until after the polls closed in the 
West.”70 For the majority, however, this did not lead to the logical 
conclusion that the ban is unnecessary to combat the harm of informational 
imbalance. Instead, the majority concluded that the staggered hours 
                                                                                                             
64
  Id., Abella J. dissenting, at paras. 112-14. 
65
  Id., at paras. 36, 41 and 118.  
66
  Id., at para. 46. 
67
  Id., at para. 45. 
68
  Id., at para. 47. 
69
  Id., Abella J. dissenting, at para. 118. 
70
  Id., at paras. 45, 120. 
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solution addresses imperfectly only the “basic problem” of western 
voters knowing who will form the government, but “does not address the 
impact on confidence of the public in light of its knowledge that the 
principle of information equality is not being respected.”71 The majority 
concluded that section 329 must be maintained because informational 
imbalance will remain if it is not. The dissent came to a very different 
conclusion based on this same evidence. The dissent found that the 
Lortie Report showed that there would be no harm to public perceptions 
from knowing the results of the 32 ridings and thus section 329 is an 
unnecessary and unjustified limitation on freedom of expression.  
The third source of evidence put forward by the government was a 
2005 Decima Research/Carleton University Poll, which was offered to 
show that without the ban under section 329, Canadians would perceive 
elections to be unfair. According to this poll, 70 per cent of Canadians 
surveyed “thought people should not be able to know election results 
from other provinces before their polls close.”72 From this, the majority 
concluded that a majority of Canadians believe in the principle of 
informational equality and that failure to adhere to this principle would 
harm Canadians’ view of the electoral system.73 However, the dissent 
revealed that the purpose and effects of staggered hours were not 
explained to the Canadians responding to the poll. The poll did not 
address one way or the other whether the particular informational 
imbalance of some westerners knowing the results of 32 Atlantic ridings 
— or, at most, 11 per cent of the election outcome — would cause 
harm.74 Absent the relevant context, the dissent stated, “the answer is a 
very general response to a very general question” which simply shows 
an “unsurprising public preference for the goal of electoral fairness”.75 
The majority relied on these three sources of evidence to conclude 
that there was some evidence that public confidence depends on the 
perception that Canadians have equal access to information before 
voting and therefore on the presence of the section 329 ban.76 The dissent 
disagreed, finding: 
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… only speculative and unpersuasive evidence to support the 
government’s claim that this particular information imbalance is of 
sufficient harm to voter behaviour or perceptions of electoral 
unfairness — the objects sought to be addressed by the ban — that it 
outweighs any damage done to a fundamental and constitutionally 
protected right.77  
The dissent concluded that there was no persuasive evidence of harm 
requiring the remedial attention of a publication ban.78  
In considering the nature of the right at issue in Bryan, the majority 
concluded that while political expression lies at the core of the guarantee 
of free expression, the right at issue was the “putative right” to receive 
election results before the polls close and that restricting access to such 
information before polls close carries less weight than after they close.79 
In contrast, the dissent identified the rights at issue as the “core democratic 
right” of the media to publish and of Canadians to receive election 
results in a timely fashion.80 It is these two very different delineations of 
the centrality of the political expression at issue that informs the analysis 
of the majority and dissent, as they determine whether that right may 
justifiably be infringed on the basis of the evidence proffered by the 
government. 
We will now discuss three significant issues raised by Bryan, the 
roots and development of which are apparent in the Thomson81 and 
Harper82 decisions: the Court’s adherence to the egalitarian model, 
reliance on the reasoned apprehension of harm evidentiary test, and 
deference to government in the electoral process. Our conclusion is that 
the majority’s treatment of these issues demonstrates a troubling 
direction for the Court in cases concerning core expressive freedom.  
III. THE CHIMERA OF INFORMATIONAL EQUALITY 
The egalitarian model has been endorsed by the Court with the goal 
of equalizing participation among the electorate.83 In Bryan, the Court 
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found that informational equality is in keeping with this egalitarian 
model and is an essential component of our democratic society. 
In the context of Bryan, “informational equality” means that all 
voters have general access to the same information before they cast their 
votes in an election. In Bryan, the Attorney General presented informational 
equality as an “inherently worthy goal”.84 The Court interpreted this to 
mean that the mere fact that one voter could have general access to 
information about election results that another voter does not have might 
create the perception of unfairness or affect voter participation or 
choices. The majority accepted that informational equality is a “logically 
direct result of the requirement that elections be fair.”85 This finding was 
based on the argument that “democracy requires that no individual 
should have a general access to information, unavailable to others, that 
can play a role in the exercise of his own right to vote.”86 Thus the Court 
found that the fairness of Canada’s electoral process demands that no 
individual voter have access to general information not available to any 
other voter.87  
As Robert E. Charney and S. Zachary Green have noted, language 
suggesting that the egalitarian model is a constitutional imperative is not 
new to the Court.88 In Harper, the Court found that spending limits are 
“an essential means of promoting fairness”,89 “an essential component of 
our democratic society”,90 and “necessary for meaningful participation in 
the electoral process”,91 with the inevitable consequence that they are not 
inconsistent with the Charter’s democratic guarantees. 
The Court has repeatedly recognized that fairness of the electoral 
process and the enhancement of participation in that process are essential 
to a free and democratic society. In Harper, the Court stated: 
Maintaining confidence in the electoral process is essential to preserve 
the integrity of the electoral system which is the cornerstone of 
Canadian democracy. In R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 136, 
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Dickson C.J. concluded that faith in social and political institutions, 
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society, is 
of central importance in a free and democratic society. If Canadians 
lack confidence in the electoral system, they will be discouraged from 
participating in a meaningful way in the electoral process. More 
importantly, they will lack faith in their elected representatives. 
Confidence in the electoral process is, therefore, a pressing and 
substantial objective.92 
We accept that maintaining confidence in the electoral process is vital in 
a free and democratic society. However, we dispute that informational 
equality as understood by the Court is required under the Constitution or 
that informational equality is an essential component of maintaining 
confidence in the electoral process.  
The majority’s approach to this issue suggests that the very notion 
that someone in Victoria might be able to find out the results of the 
election in St. John’s offends the principle of equality. The majority has 
accepted without question that informational equality is a necessary 
component of electoral fairness and thus required in a free and 
democratic society. According to the majority’s opinion, the electoral 
process would not be fair — or, at the least, would not be perceived to be 
fair — without the government legislating to ensure that the information 
available to Canadians before they go to the polls is “equal”. Both the 
government and the majority of the Court speciously accept that 
informational equality is, first, a realistic goal and, second, an inherently 
good principle.  
The egalitarian model is not universally appropriate, necessary, or 
effective in Canada’s electoral process. This is not a process in which 
every aspect can and should be regulated. There are numerous aspects of 
the electoral process that are not equal and cannot be equalized. For 
example, the resources available to political candidates are not and 
cannot be completely equalized. The government cannot regulate a 
candidate’s political capital or the amount of interest the media might 
take in that candidate; the political, social, or media status of a candidate 
might affect the amount of information about that candidate that is 
available to the public at large and thus affect the elector’s vote. Yet, this 
is not seen as unfair, or worthy or capable of regulation.93 
                                                                                                             
92
  Id., at para. 103. 
93
  See Christopher D. Bredt & Laura Pottie, “Liberty, Equality and Deference: A Comment 
on Colin Feasby’s ‘Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process’” (2005) 29 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 79 
Furthermore, it is absurd to suggest that the government can or 
should regulate information available to voters that might play a role in 
the exercise of their right to vote, in an effort to make that available 
information “equal”. Information that is “generally available” to voters 
is not equal across the country. A pundit opining in the local watering 
hole might impart information about the election to other patrons that is 
not available generally to other Canadians but which might affect how or 
whether those bar patrons choose to vote. The Federal Liberal Party 
might choose to take one advertising tactic in Nova Scotia and a 
different one in British Columbia; the information and spin addressed to 
those provinces might be completely different but inaccessible to 
residents in the other province, yet influence how those voters act.  
The Court has approved of legislation that suppresses expressive 
freedom because it has the goal of informational equality. This suggests 
that the government should not only curb an excess of information 
reaching one part of the electorate, but also that the government should 
actively ensure that each piece of information available to each Canadian 
voter is the same across the country. The value of this forced 
equalization is questionable. Information that is important and relevant 
to voters in a rural riding in Saskatchewan is simply not going to be 
entirely the same as the information that is significant to constituents in 
urban Toronto. While there are some universal issues that extend across 
Canada’s vast expanse — health care, for example — not every electoral 
issue that might affect a voter’s choice will be shared by every other 
voter. It is not possible to provide each Canadian with equal access to 
every shred of information that is disseminated to any other Canadian. 
Further, even if equal access were possible, the wisdom of the principle 
is doubtful. For example, it would be both inefficient and ineffective to 
ensure that an inhabitant of Cape Breton is apprised of how street crime 
in the downtown eastside of Vancouver will be handled by the 
government, with the goal of informational equality across the country. 
As the majority in Thomson94 found, and the dissent in Bryan 
reiterated, “it is impossible to immunize voters from all conceivable 
influences … The question is whether the impact will be a harmful 
one”.95 As the dissent found in Bryan, the government provided no 
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convincing evidence that informational imbalances have an inherently 
harmful impact in that all information imbalances are problematic or 
harmful, either perceptually or behaviourally.96 One of the pieces of 
evidence provided by the government to support its position, the Lortie 
Report, does not suggest that the mere fact of an information imbalance 
creates a perceptual harm to public confidence in electoral fairness. In 
fact, as the dissent notes, the Commission observed that “the release of 
some election results before polls close in the West — specifically, 
results from the 32 seats in Atlantic Canada — would not constitute a 
major problem so long as other results from eastern Canada were not 
available until after the polls closed in the West”.97 
The majority found that in “curb[ing] widespread dissemination of 
this information … [section 329] contributes materially to its objective 
of informational equality between voters in different parts of the 
country.”98 The objective, therefore, is informational equality and the 
means to achieve this objective is to curb the dissemination of 
information. The majority did recognize that election results are part of 
the political process and, thus, at the core of expression guaranteed by 
the Charter, and that curbing the dissemination of that information does 
restrict the right to freedom of expression.99 However, the majority was 
quick to state: 
Whether the s. 2(b) interest in receiving or disseminating political 
information, or both, is at the centre of this case, it is not at all clear 
that that interest can supersede the value of the countervailing principle 
that no voter should have general access to information about the 
results of the election unavailable to others.100  
With respect, we suggest that freedom of expression should supersede 
the putative inherently important goal of informational equality. With 
this statement, the majority of the Court has elevated the purported 
democratic imperative “that no individual should have general access to 
information, unavailable to others, that can play a role in the exercise of 
his own right to vote”101 over that of freedom of expression. To answer 
the Court’s query as to why one would suggest that the right to receive 
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information about the election might supersede the principle of 
informational equality, a simple response is that one is a right explicitly 
guaranteed in the Charter while the other is a principle the value of 
which is not at all clear, and certainly not from the evidence before the 
Court.  
IV. THE CONVENIENCE OF REASONED APPREHENSION OF HARM 
The “reasoned apprehension of harm” evidentiary test was developed 
in the context of speech that is far from the core of the expressive 
freedom guarantee, but is now being applied to cases concerning core 
political expression. In this section, we discuss how the Court in Bryan102 
characterized the right at issue, and then consider the Court’s application 
of the reasoned apprehension of harm standard in that context. 
1.  The Relationship of the Right at Issue to the Core of Expressive 
Freedom 
Although both the majority and dissent recognized that the right at 
issue is political expression, the Court split on the location of the right 
within the core of the expressive freedom guarantee. The decision of 
how to locate the right at issue is crucial to the level of deference the 
Court will show to the government’s decision. The Court has acknowledged 
that when freedom of expression comes into conflict with other core 
values in society, they must engage in a “concrete weighing of the 
relative significance of each of the relevant values”.103 The Court will 
weigh the freedom of expression claims in light of their relative 
connection to the even more fundamental values of the search for 
political, artistic and scientific truth, the protection of individual autonomy 
and self-development, and the promotion of public participation in the 
democratic process. When the form of expression placed in jeopardy 
falls farther from the “centre core of the spirit”, the Court has ruled 
restrictions on such expression less difficult to justify.104 Thus, the burden 
of proof is meant to be the most demanding where the government is 
restricting speech at the core of the expressive freedom guarantee.  
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Though the majority in Bryan acknowledged that the expression 
limited by the government in this case is indeed political expression, and 
thus at the core of the expressive freedom guarantee, Bastarache J. 
shifted the right claimed to the furthest outreaches of that core: 
While political expression is undoubtedly important, the right at issue 
is the putative right to receive election results before the polls close; 
restricting access to such information before polls close carries less 
weight than after they close.105 
The majority further emphasized that the limitation on freedom of 
expression in issue in Bryan involved no suppression of any information 
at all, but only a brief delay in its communication to voters who have not 
yet cast their ballots.106 Thus, although the ban restricts the democratic 
rights of the media to publish and of Canadians to receive election results 
in a timely fashion, the timing of the availability of that information 
shifts that right further from the core of the expressive guarantee. As a 
result, because the government is not restricting speech at the core of the 
expressive freedom guarantee, the Court reduced the government’s 
burden of proof. This result followed despite the fact that expression 
outside the core of the expressive guarantee has previously been reserved 
for hate mongering, soliciting for prostitution, tobacco advertising and 
pornography.107 
The dissent in Bryan fundamentally disagreed with the majority’s 
characterization of the rights at issue, finding that the rights at issue are 
the core democratic rights of the media to publish and of Canadians to 
receive election results in a timely fashion.108 Communicating and 
receiving election results is a “core democratic right” and an “essential 
part of the democratic process”.109 The dissent placed these rights at the 
very heart of the core of the expressive freedom guarantee: 
It is difficult to imagine a more important aspect of democratic 
expression than voting and learning the results of their vote. The s. 329 
ban impairs the right both to disseminate and receive election results at 
a crucial time in the electoral process. To suggest that this is only a 
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delay, not the suppression of information, unduly minimizes the 
significance both of the information and of the delay.110 
Because the dissent positioned the rights at issue at the core of section 
2(b), it required clear and convincing evidence to justify limiting the 
availability of the information about election results.  
2.  The Development of the Reasoned Apprehension of Harm 
Standard 
In cases in which the Court has been faced with inconclusive or 
competing social science evidence relating the harm to the legislature’s 
measures, it has relied on a reasoned apprehension of that harm to justify 
restrictions on expression.111 In such cases, logic, reason and some social 
science evidence are relied upon in the course of the justification 
analysis.112 Logic and common sense become all the more important in 
cases where the harms are “difficult, if not impossible, to measure 
scientifically”.113  
The harm at which the blackout period under section 329 is aimed is 
the prevention of informational imbalance so as to protect against the 
perception or reality of electoral unfairness. The fear is that if public 
confidence is lost, voting patterns may change and ultimately the 
outcome of elections could be affected.114 Given that the harm associated 
with the loss of public confidence in the electoral process or with a 
breach of the principle of informational equality is difficult to measure, 
the majority found that logic and reason assisted by some social science 
evidence could constitute sufficient proof of the harm. The majority 
found that the objective asserted by the government — specifically, 
informational equality — is a matter of the “values and principles 
essential to a free and democratic society”.115 In cases of this kind, it may 
not be appropriate to require proof according to the usual civil requirements.  
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As the majority in Bryan noted, it was through a series of cases on 
freedom of expression that the Court came to recognize that the paucity 
of social science evidence in some cases required that a “reasoned 
apprehension of harm” could be sufficient to ground a section 1 argument.116 
What the Court did not explain is that the reasoned apprehension of 
harm standard was developed in cases regarding peripheral speech. The 
origins of this standard well outside the core of expression guaranteed by 
the Charter raises the question of whether it is appropriate to apply it to 
political expression, which is at the heart of the guarantee. 
The reasoned apprehension of harm standard was formulated by 
Sopinka J. in Butler117 to uphold the obscenity provisions of the Criminal 
Code118 in the absence of a demonstrated causal link between pornographic 
materials and harm to women or other disadvantaged groups.119 The 
Court upheld the provisions on the basis that Parliament had a “reasoned 
apprehension of harm” that degrading sexual representations of women 
affected men’s attitudes in such a way that encouraged degrading 
treatment of women.120 In Keegstra,121 Dickson C.J.C. employed similar 
reasoning to uphold the criminalization of hate speech. In RJR-
MacDonald,122 the Court held, in the absence of direct scientific evidence 
showing a causal link between the advertising bans and a decrease in 
tobacco consumption, that as a matter of logic advertising bans and 
package warnings lead to a reduction in tobacco use.123 In Sharpe,124 
McLachlin C.J.C. looked to this standard in finding that Parliament is 
not required to adduce scientific proof based on concrete evidence that 
the possession of child pornography causes harm to children.125  
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3. Application of the Reasoned Apprehension of Harm Standard to 
Political Expression 
Before Harper126 and now Bryan,127 the reasoned apprehension of 
harm standard had only been applied in cases dealing with relatively 
“low value” speech on the periphery of the freedom of expression 
guarantee — obscenity, hate speech, and commercial advertising.128 
However, the Court has now applied this standard in cases concerning 
core political expression. With Bryan, the Court has fully embraced the 
reasoned apprehension of harm test in the electoral context under section 
1. The acceptance of this standard in the core area of political expression 
is of concern. 
One of the principal problems with the Court’s reasoned apprehension 
of harm standard in Harper and Bryan, particularly as applied in the area 
of core political expression, is that the mere possibility that “harm” 
might conceivably be occasioned by a particular expressive act seems to 
be sufficient to justify limiting expressive freedom. Though the Court 
has articulated a model which theoretically requires the government to 
prove causation of harm on a balance of probabilities, in practice the 
Court has lowered the threshold of proof of causation “from probability 
to possibility, or even conceivability” of harm.129 
Of particular concern is that the reasoned apprehension of harm 
standard is being employed to support the suppression of factual 
information, especially in the context of a national election. The harm 
that the government is concerned about in this case is what will result 
from the dissemination of factual information about election results and 
the commentary thereon. The suppression of facts is contrary to the 
search for truth that is so often identified as one of the fundamental 
purposes of free expression.130 That the dissemination of facts about an 
election might affect Canadians’ perception of electoral fairness — even 
if there is no convincing evidence that real harm may occur — does not 
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seem to be a sufficiently reasonable apprehension to justify limiting 
freedom of political expression.  
To reiterate, political expression is considered “high value” speech 
because it furthers the core values of individual autonomy and self-
development, the search for truth, and the promotion of public 
participation in the democratic process.131 Yet, the majority’s decision is 
at the expense of all of these core values. It is fundamental to our 
democratic system that citizens not only have the right to vote, but also 
the right to decide how to exercise that vote in whatever way they 
wish.132 That the government and majority of the Court support a law 
that suppresses electoral information on the basis that Canadians might 
choose to act in a harmful manner — by choosing how or whether to 
vote on that information, or by losing faith in the fairness of the electoral 
process — based upon that information is troubling. As Neuborne has 
noted: 
[w]hen society provides its members with lawful choices, respect for 
individual dignity compels that the choices be the autonomous 
expression of individual preference. It is impossible to respect 
individual autonomy with the left hand while selectively controlling 
the information available to the individual with the right hand. A 
purportedly free individual choice premised on a government 
controlled information flow is a basic affront to human dignity.133  
The majority’s approach to the harm that could conceivably result from 
informational imbalance is troubling. This ban “protects” Canadians 
from perceiving inequality or choosing how, or whether, to vote based 
on factual information about the electoral results of 32 Atlantic ridings, 
or, at most, 11 per cent of the election outcome. In upholding this ban, 
the majority of the Court has ignored the individual autonomy of Canadians 
to engage in the electoral process upon whatever basis they so choose. It 
is not appropriate to take a test developed to address the deficiency of 
evidence that pornography and hate speech are harmful and apply it to 
cases concerning the core Charter right of political expression.  
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4. Evidence of Harm 
Neither the approach of the majority, nor of the dissent, to the 
sufficiency of evidence required to limit a core Charter value is unique to 
the Bryan134 case. Indeed, the division in the Court regarding how to 
address the lack of definitive proof for the factual premises underlying 
the challenged laws reveals a true schism in the Court’s approach.135 
Before Bryan, in both Thomson136 and Harper,137 the Court divided on 
how great a burden to impose on the government of adducing evidence 
when dealing with constitutional claims involving deeply political, 
sociological and philosophical concepts. While judicial deference may 
be appropriate in cases where the mischief addressed by the statute is not 
capable of empirical demonstration, a vocal segment of the Court has 
emphasized that deference must not relieve the government of the 
burden which the Charter places upon it to demonstrate that the limits it 
has imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable;138 the 
“contextual approach” should not relieve the state of its obligation to 
show that the restriction is justified on a balance of probabilities.139  
As Jamie Cameron notes, the requirement that limits on 
constitutionally protected activity be supported by evidence of harm 
must be taken seriously; not to do so makes a mockery of section 1.140 
Unfortunately, a majority of the Court has found it acceptable to make 
findings in favour of the government that suggest that “evidence does 
not matter, and that limits on constitutional rights are reasonable and 
justifiable whether or not the government can show that exercising of the 
right poses an articulated or articulable harm.”141 This is so even in cases 
such as Bryan where there is very little — if any — concrete evidence 
that harm would result, or be seen to result, from the release of election 
results from 32 Atlantic ridings, but there is a real, evidenced harm to the 
media and the electorate through the suppression of this information 
about a national election. As the dissent stated: 
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It is far from clear to me that there is any evidence at all to demonstrate 
that the ban in s. 329, in the context of staggered hours, is directed at a 
demonstrated harm and sufficiently promotes public confidence in the 
fairness of elections to justify infringing the right to disseminate and 
receive election results. …  
On the other hand, the harm caused by the ban to the expressive rights 
in s. 2(b) is considerable. For the duration of the ban, the Atlantic 
election results are denied to all Canadians west of the Atlantic 
provinces, many of whom have already voted. It is difficult to imagine 
a more important aspect of democratic expression than voting and 
learning the results of their vote. The s. 329 ban impairs the right both 
to disseminate and receive election results at a crucial time in the 
electoral process. To suggest that this is only a delay, not the 
suppression of information, unduly minimizes the significance both of 
the information and of the delay.142 
Indeed, the majority’s preference for “logic and commonsense”, as 
applied to weak evidence, over the very real and practical deleterious 
effect on the freedom of expression of individual Canadians and the 
media to report and comment upon a national election — not just voting 
results, but the commentary, speeches and opinion that accompanies the 
results — is disturbing. Expressive freedom is at the heart of our democratic 
system. The electoral process is the most fundamental democratic act. 
The Court should be wary of undue deference to Parliament based on 
weak evidence where Parliament is attempting to limit political expression 
in the electoral context.  
V. DEFERENCE AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
One of the “important principles” drawn from the Court’s decision 
in Harper, and re-emphasized by the majority in the Bryan case, is that 
courts ought to take a “natural attitude of deference” toward Parliament 
when dealing with election laws.143 There is an important issue of 
whether this principle should be accepted as universally appropriate or 
wise. 
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There is a clear tendency on the part of Parliament to legislate in its 
own self-interest in its role of regulating the democratic process.144 As 
well, there is good evidence that the electoral regime is designed to 
protect and promote established parties and incumbents.145 Though the 
argument may be made that the self-interest of Parliament is not served 
by restricting access to eastern election results in more western parts of 
the country before voting ends, the self-interest of Parliament in 
regulating the electoral process should not be ignored by the Court when 
considering the level of deference owed to government in cases of this 
kind.146 There should of course be a heightened scrutiny by the Court of 
the government’s decisions when the government is particularly self-
interested — for example, when Parliament legislates to grant 
incumbents greater broadcast time — but the government’s general self-
interest in this process must at all times be considered when determining 
if deference is appropriate. Deference to government decisions should 
not be assumed simply because a case concerns the electoral process. 
However, the courts have taken an attitude of deference toward 
Parliament when dealing with election laws on the basis that Parliament, 
and not the Court, is best equipped to determine what is best for 
Canadians in this process. Judicial deference to Parliament should 
acknowledge that Parliament’s authority to regulate must be balanced 
against Canadians’ rights to comment on and receive information about 
that electoral system. These competing interests must be balanced with 
care, and certainly with greater regard than is demonstrated by the 
majority in Bryan to the importance of the right at issue. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Canada is increasingly tending to diminish 
the importance of political expression as being at the core of the right 
protected by section 2(b). Bryan and Harper suggest that the Court will 
adhere to the egalitarian model without question, regardless of whether 
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the particular objective of equality is realistic or appropriate when 
considered in its context. The Court’s jurisprudence in the area of 
political expression also suggests the troubling adoption of an 
evidentiary standard — the reasoned apprehension of harm standard — 
developed to address deficiencies in the kind of evidence that may be 
offered to prove harm caused by certain kinds of peripheral speech. This 
standard is ill-suited to the area of “high value”, core political speech, 
because it relies on the mere conceivability that harm may result from a 
certain kind of speech to help justify its limitation. Bryan also solidifies 
the Court’s increasing and unquestioning acceptance of deference to 
government when issues regarding the electoral process arise. The ray of 
hope in these recent decisions is the strong dissents, which recognize 
that “political expression lies at the heart of the guarantee of free 
expression and underpins the very foundation of our democracy”,147 and 
thus any limit on the availability of political information must be 
justified by clear and convincing evidence.148 
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